S1. Additional analyses: examining volatility
This section investigates whether the observed increase in trading on technical trends around earnings announcements affects stock return volatility (see Section 5.5 of the paper). We measure realized volatility using high-frequency TAQ transaction data because daily data are less useful over very short measurement windows (Lyle et al. 2017; Bollerslev et al. 2018) . We first sum the squared logarithmic returns within each day, where returns are calculated for every 5-minute interval during normal trading hours. We choose a 5-minute interval to balance the bias induced by market microstructure noise against the coarseness of using a wider interval (Andersen et al. 2003; Hansen and Lunde 2006; Bollerslev et al. 2018) . We then take the average over days [0, 2] and subtract the average over [-41, -11 ] to calculate abnormal volatility (Abn_Volat). Panel A of Table S1 shows that Abn_Volat is highly skewed with a mean of 0.211 and median of 0.053. As such, we calculate a second measure, Abn_Volat_Ln, as the natural logarithm of the [0, 2] event window volatility divided by the [-41, -11] non-event window volatility. Because the literature does not have an agreed-upon measure, we tabulate results using both variables. Table S1 provide results of model (1), using abnormal volatility as the dependent variable. The coefficient on Post in column (i) is insignificant for Abn_Volat but significantly positive in column (ii) for Abn_Volat_Ln. These results provide some evidence of an increase in volatility upon the roll-out of automated articles. Columns (iii) and (iv) provide results of model (2). The interaction on Post * UE_Abs is insignificant in both models, which is consistent with our prior results that trading at the earnings announcement is uncorrelated with the earnings news. The interaction on Post * Ret_Abs is significantly positive in column (iv), consistent with the increased trading on trailing returns driving an increase in iii volatility. Columns (v) and (vi) provide results of model (3). Column (v) finds insignificant results while (vi) finds that the increased volatility is concentrated in the articles with Extreme Ret_Abs. In sum, for at least one of the volatility measures, these results are generally consistent with the increased trading on extreme technical trends driving an increase in volatility around earnings announcements.
Columns (i) and (ii) of Panel B of

S2. Additional analyses: shorter versus longer trailing returns windows
We calculate Ret_Abs based on the average of the year-to-date (YTD) and trailingtwelve-month (TTM) returns stated in the automated articles because we have little ex ante reason to predict that investors use one signal more heavily than the other. Prior literature provides minimal evidence on how trading in response to technical trends varies with the length of the trend. One exception is Griffin, Nardira, and Stulz (2007) , which finds that longer trends appear to elicit greater trading volume, but they examine trends up to just 10 weeks. It is unclear whether the results in Griffin et al. (2007) generalize to trends as long as one year.
For descriptive purposes, Panel A of Table S2 presents results of model (3) using different Ret_Abs specifications. Column (i) presents results of averaging YTD and TTM as in the paper. Column (ii) uses just TTM. The coefficient magnitude is slightly smaller than in column (i) and the t-statistic is slightly larger, but otherwise the results are virtually unchanged.
Column (iii) finds slightly weaker results when using just YTD returns, and column (iv) finds similar results when using the maximum of TTM and YTD. Panel B presents results of model (3) but with Abn_IndivVol as the dependent variable and finds a similar pattern of results. Overall, the results in Panels A and B find that the specification of Ret_Abs does not materially alter the paper's findings, but that the average of YTD and TTM seems to best capture the returns information being used by investors responding to the articles. iv Panel C explores the fact that the YTD returns presented in the article could range from just a few weeks for earnings announcements early in the calendar year to almost twelve months for announcements later in the year. We do this by interacting Ret_Abs with an indicator variable measuring the length of the YTD returns window based on the calendar quarter in which the earnings announcement occurs. Column (i) of Panel C examines calendar YTD returns for earnings announcements in calendar quarter one (Q1) versus the rest of the year (Q2-Q4).
Results load only on Post * Extreme Ret_Abs * Q2-Q4, indicating that individual investors tend to trade on longer-window technical trends. Column (ii) divides earnings announcements into Q1-Q2 versus Q3-Q4, and again only finds significant results in the longer window. Columns (iii) and (iv) find similar results for the dependent variable Abn_IndivVol. Overall, the results in Panel C are consistent with Griffin et al. (2007) and suggest that individual investors who trade on trailing returns tend to use longer-window trends.
S3. Robustness tests: different earnings announcement windows
As discussed in Section 5 of the paper, our tests examine trading volume that occurs within days [0, 2] relative to the earnings announcement. We choose a three-day window to allow individual investors adequate time to find and respond to the automated AP articles. This section investigates the sensitivity of our main results to the event window length. In short, our results are qualitatively unchanged using a variety of measurement windows around the earnings announcement.
S4. Robustness tests: including control variables
This section investigates extensions of our main models (3) and (4) including control variables. The coefficients of interest in (3) relate to the slopes of relations between Abn_Vol and each of our four UE_Abs and Ret_Abs, so to bias our hypothesis tests an omitted variable must: i) correlate with the slopes (not just levels) of those relations; and ii) evolve over time in a way that correlates with our staggered adoption of AP automated articles. 1 The likelihood of such a correlated omitted variable seems low given that the roll-out of automated articles was largely unrelated to the contents of the firm's earnings announcement, as well as to many firm characteristics (BDZ 2018 We standardize all Controls by subtracting the sample mean and dividing by the standard deviation.
Column (i) of Panel A Table S4 presents results from estimating model (3b). Controls and interactions are untabulated for brevity. Results in column (i) are qualitatively unchanged from those without controls in the paper. Column (ii) repeats column (i) but uses the dependent variable Abn_IndivVol. Again, the results are qualitatively unchanged from those in the paper.
Panel B of Table S4 presents results of model (4) Ret_Abs for the HighAcqCost group is now insignificant at 10%.
S5. Robustness tests: pre-treatment parallel trends
An identifying assumption of our DID models is that investors' trading on earnings and returns signals would have trended similarly between the treatment and non-treatment firms in the absence of automated articles (the parallel trends assumption). We cannot observe the counterfactual trends, but we can examine the pre-treatment trends to confirm that there are no significant differences in the pre-automation period. BDZ examine pre-treatment trends in our model (1) and find no evidence of violations. We extend BDZ's analyses to models (2), (3), and (4). Our tests use observations prior to the beginning of automation on October 14, 2014.
In Table S5 Panel A, we examine model (2) Finally, Panel C of Table S5 performs analyses for model (4). In total, sixteen of 120 ix tests are significant at a 10% level. These differences are concentrated in the 2015Q3 and 2015Q4 treatment firms. Dropping these firms from model (4) produces qualitatively unchanged results. In sum, these tests find no evidence that our results are driven by parallel trend violations.
S6. Robustness tests: intraday analysis
It is possible that the more sophisticated individual investors in our sample respond to the automated AP articles very quickly after they are released, and this subset of investors does so using earnings information. The individuals who respond later may be less sophisticated and trade on trailing returns. If so, even the shortest measurement window of [0, 1] in Section S3 may be too coarse to identify these sophisticated individual investors. To address this concern, we examine intraday trading activity immediately after the automated articles are released.
Similar analysis is performed in Rogers et al. (2016) , which finds substantial increases in trading volume within a few seconds of Dow Jones Newswire media coverage of insider trading filings, with the increase reaching up to 1,000% within the first two minutes.
One difficulty with this analysis is the limited number of observations with available short-window trading around automated articles. Very few earnings announcements are released during trading hours (deHaan et al. 2015) , which means that the corresponding automated articles are typically released outside of normal trading hours. We start with all articles released during normal trading hours and drop articles released in the first and last 30 minutes of the trading day to avoid opening and closing effects (Rogers et al. 2016) . We also require a 30 minute gap between the earnings announcement and article release to avoid professional trading that happens immediately after the earnings announcement. Our remaining sample for the intraday analysis is 172 observations. Thus, like BDZ (2018) we do not observe an average increase in trading volume immediately after the articles are released, which suggests that it takes time for investors to discover the articles.
Panels B and C of Table S6 regress the within-firm change in trading volume on UE_Abs and Ret_Abs, including partitions into extreme and non-extreme versions. None of the coefficients are statistically significant over any of the three measurement windows, which is inconsistent with trading on either earnings or trailing returns. These results are consistent with our prior inferences that individual investors responding to the articles do not appear to use earnings information. However, these results should be interpreted with some caution given the modest sample size.
S7. Other robustness tests
This section discusses results of other robustness tests that are untabulated for brevity.
We repeat models (3) and (4) for each test unless indicated otherwise. None of the results of these tests materially alter our conclusions from the paper.
• It is possible that our results are not driven by the automated articles, but rather are due to recent momentum that mechanically correlates with the trailing returns reported in the xi articles. To bias our results, the relation between recent momentum and trading volume at earnings announcements would have to evolve over time in a way that correlates with the staggered rollout of AP's automated articles. For robustness we control for recent momentum, calculated as the firm's absolute cumulative return over the week prior to the earnings announcement, and sorted into deciles and de-meaned like Ret_Abs. A drawback of these tests is that the preceding week's momentum is, by definition, a component of the trailing returns stated in the articles, so controlling for recent momentum may remove part of the treatment effect we are testing for. Still, untabulated results controlling for recent momentum are qualitatively unchanged, as are results controlling for momentum and the full set of other controls discussed in Section S4.
• Our sample selection requires that firms received zero earnings-related media coverage from AP in the years leading up to the automated article. Assuming that media outlets tend to have similar supply and demand functions, it is unlikely that our sample firms received many media articles from non-AP outlets. BDZ (2018) confirm that our sample firms have minimal media coverage from non-AP outlets with available data, and that there is no evidence of an increase in non-AP media coverage over the sample period that may confound our tests. We further reduce concerns about confounding media articles by dropping the 2.4% of observations that have a media article in RavenPack Dow Jones edition in the earnings announcement window, as well as the 0.3% of observations for which a human AP reporter updated the automated article after it was released. Untabulated results are qualitatively unchanged after dropping these observations.
• Negative earnings are less value-relevant than positive earnings (Hayn 1995) , so pooling profit and loss quarters could obscure investors' earnings usage. We extend our models to xii separately examine profits and losses, and again fail to find evidence of earnings-based trading in either subset of quarters.
• Dropping 1,698 observations with UE of zero produces qualitatively unchanged results.
• We calculate analyst-based UE following prior literature to best capture firms' earnings news. Results calculating UE using a seasonal random walk (SRW) produce unchanged results for model (3). Results of model (4) are similar except that the Extreme Ret_Abs coefficient in the high acquisition cost group has reduced significance when using Abn_Vol as the dependent variable (t = 1.66), but remains strongly significant when using
Abn_IndivVol as the dependent variable (t = 3.40). Also, the NonExtreme UE_Abs coefficients in model (4) become significantly negative for the low acquisition cost sample.
These negative results for SRW-based UE are illogical for two reasons. First, the analystbased earnings surprises are provided in the low acquisition cost articles, so the results indicate that investors incur the cost of obtaining information for the SRW UE only in cases when they already have the analyst-based surprise. Second, the negative coefficients indicate that these investors simultaneously obtain the SRW UE but are also less likely to trade than if they had not seen the article to begin with. Given the illogical nature of these results, and
given the lack of these results in model (3), we hesitate to draw much inference from the differing coefficients in this robustness test.
• In calculating analyst-based UE, prioritizing IBES over Zacks data instead of using the average produces unchanged results, and vice-versa. Also, using only IBES or Zacks data produces unchanged results.
• Dropping observations with price less than $1 produces unchanged results, except that the coefficient on Extreme Ret_Abs becomes insignificant in model (3) when using Abn_Vol as xiii the dependent variable, and the coefficient on Non-Extreme UE_Abs in model (4) becomes significant for the high acquisition cost subsample when using Abn_IndivVol as the dependent variable. These results reduce concerns about low denominators, as well as concerns that large UE are concentrated in firms with especially high trading costs.
• Partitioning the sample based on the firm's first versus subsequent quarters of automated articles fails to find evidence of earnings usage in either group. We continue to find evidence of trading on extreme returns in both groups. These tests reduce concerns that investors first use articles to learn about risk via trailing returns and use earnings in subsequent quarters to learn about earnings innovations.
• One concern is that the increased media coverage increases the likelihood that managers preempt large negative earnings surprises. If so, the earnings surprise at the forthcoming earnings announcement would be smaller and could potentially confound our results. We address this concern by rerunning our models to exclude 210 firm-quarters in which a negative earnings warning is provided before the earnings announcement (Tucker 2007 ).
These results are qualitatively unchanged from our main analyses.
S8. Discussion of non-random analyst coverage
As discussed in Section 3.2, the AP algorithm includes the analyst consensus when the Zacks database has at least three outstanding analyst forecasts prior to the earnings announcement. Non-random variation in analyst coverage could raise two internal validity concerns and one concern about generalizability.
First, if analysts' forecasting decisions are functions of the current earnings surprise, then analysts' selection functions would introduce correlated omitted variables in our tests of earnings-window trading volume (e.g., important earnings announcements generate both analyst xiv forecasts and higher volume). This is not a concern in our setting because AP's algorithm uses pre-announcement analyst forecasts to determine whether or not to include the analyst consensus in the AP article. This pre-determination eliminates many event-driven selection concerns that would typically come up in a study of responses to earnings announcements.
Second, it is possible that firms with 3 or more analysts ("high-analyst firms") and firms with fewer than 3 analysts ("low-analyst firms") have different secular trends in trading volume, and that these trends coincide with the staggered roll-out of automated articles (i.e., a violation of the parallel trends assumption). Given our research design, to bias our tests these trends in trading volume must also covary over time with UE_Abs and Ret_Abs in a way that confounds our test, which seems unlikely. To further reduce concerns, Section S5 of the Supplementary Materials finds no difference in pre-treatment trends between our high and low acquisition cost samples.
Finally, the non-random assignment of analyst coverage also raises a concern about generalizability. Our research design enables us to observe a condition in which both awareness and acquisition costs are reduced for high-analyst firms, and we fail to find any use of earnings information. We are also able to observe a condition in which awareness costs are reduced for low-analyst firms, and we again fail to find any use of earnings information. However, we are not able to observe a condition in which both awareness and acquisition costs are reduced for low-analyst firms. Thus, while we find that reducing both awareness and acquisition costs is insufficient to motivate the use of earnings information in high-analyst firms, we cannot be sure that this specific result would generalize to low-analyst firms.
Not observing this condition is an unavoidable limitation of our research design.
However, our results can speak to the large group of firms that do have 3 or more analysts. In xv addition, integration costs and behavioral biases are likely to be larger frictions for firms with fewer analysts and weaker information environments. Thus, if lowering awareness and acquisition costs is not sufficient to change investors' use of high-analyst firms' information, it seems even less likely to change use of low-analyst firms' information. Still, it is possible, and we acknowledge this limitation of our tests.
This appendix includes definitions for variables that are not defined in the main paper. Refer to Appendix B of the paper for other variable definitions.
Variable Description Source 20YYQx_ TreatmentFirm
Indicator variable set to 1 for all firm-quarters of a firm, if the firm received AP automated articles starting in quarter x of 20YY.
AP
Abn_Volat
Abnormal returns volatility: the sum of squared logarithmic returns for each 5-minute interval for each trading day. This daily measure is averaged over the [0,2] event window relative to the earnings announcement and subtracts the average over the [-41,-11] non-event window prior to the earnings announcement. The resulting amount is multiplied by 100.
TAQ
Abn_Volat_Ln
The natural logarithm of average volatility over the [0,2] event window divided by the average volatility over the [-41,-11] non-event window.
TAQ
Busy_Day
Decile ranking (0=low, 9=high) of the number of earnings announcements occurring on the same day as the firm's earnings announcement.
Compustat
Earnings_Warning Indicator variable set to 1 if management issued a negative earnings warning (quarterly earnings guidance below expectations) in days [-55, -2] relative to the earnings announcement. 
Zacks, IBES
FQ4
Compustat
Report_Lag
Lag between the fiscal quarter end and the earnings announcement date: set to the log of the number of days between the quarter end and the earnings announcement date. This table presents results of examining intraday trading immediately around the release of automated articles. We retain 172 observations with automated articles released during trading hours that are neither within the first or last 30 minutes of the trading day nor within 30 minutes of the earnings announcement. Turnover Before and Turnover After are total turnover during the 2, 5, and 10 minute intervals relative to the article release, scaled by average turnover during [-30,-1] . Difference is Turnover After less Turnover Before. Difference is the dependent variable in Panels B and C. T-statistics are in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1%; ** at 5%; and * at 10%. 
Compustat xviii
Panel
